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Abstract—This paper is about trust establishment and trust
evaluations techniques. A short background about trust, trusted
computing and security in embedded systems is given. An analysis
has been done of an incident network scenario with roaming
users and a set of basic security needs has been identified.
These needs have been used to derive security requirements for
devices and systems, supporting the considered scenario. Using
the requirements, a list of major security challenges for future
research regarding trust establishment in dynamic networks have
been collected and elaboration on some different approaches for
future research has been done.This work was supported by the
Knowledge foundation and RISE within the ARIES project.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information and communication technologies have increas-
ingly influenced and changed our daily life. They allow global
connectivity and easy access to distributed applications and
digital services over the Internet, both for business and private
use, from on-line banking, e-commerce and e-government to
electronic health care and outsourcing of computation and
storage (e.g., data centers, grid, etc). Networks are steadily
evolving and the numbers of IP based applications are growing
rapidly. In the near future there will be billions of networked
embedded devices, “things” and entities that are interacting all
together forming systems of systems. These new existing and
emerging end user devices, and the server resources, are inter-
connected by dynamic and heterogeneous networks. We know
that malicious or counterfeit elements can be introduced to an
electronic process through most of these devices and in most
of the networks that these devices use for communication.
Hence, preserving an acceptable level of security in such a
diverse environment is a challenging task. Even if we agree on
this, there are several different approaches to securing future
devices and networks and not a consensus in the research
community on which issues that are the most important to
tackle.
The paper is organized as follows. First we give an overview
of related work and in particular approaches to trust evaluation,
trusted computing and embedded systems security. Next, in
Section III, we describe the incident network scenario we
have been working with and the needs we have identified
by analyzing this scenario and related documents. Through
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a systematic analysis of the the identified needs, we have
derived a set of security requirements presented in the form of
a requirements hierarchy diagram. In Section IV, we discuss
security challenges in relation to the security requirements we
have identified. Different approaches to attribute-based trust
evaluation as well as analytic evolution and comparison of trust
models are discussed in more details. Finally, we conclude in
Section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Approaches to trust evaluation
Trust can be described as the degree to which confidence is
placed in somebody or something. Encyclopædia Britannica
gives one definition as: ”assured reliance on the character,
ability, strength, or truth of someone or something”.
In computer science the research regarding trust is diverse
and addresses how trust can be achieved, how it can be
evaluated, how it can be effectively and efficiently managed,
how it can be transferred (recommendation) and models for
how multiple, partial trust values can be combined into a single
trust level.
The idea of handling trust as a problem separated from the
application in question was introduced in [1]. We are mainly
interested in trust evaluation, i.e. how to automatically assign
a trust level to something or somebody, based on available
information about relevant properties. A good overview of
this problem is given in [2]. An analytical model of trust
establishment is given in [3], and [4] describes how context in-
formation can improve trust evaluation. How recommendations
can improve efficiency in trust establishment is shown in [5].
The approach is interesting since it addresses the connection
establishment problem, which normally uses a strong but
cumbersome protocol, by introducing trust relevant knowledge
to be able to slacken, and thereby simplify, the protocol. In
[6] four of the most relevant trust and reputation models are
described and an effectiveness comparison using simulations
is presented. This is a relevant problem to address since there
are few attempts at systematic comparisons between different
solutions. An example of how trust evaluation can improve
performance in an application is given in [7], where the
increase in the resilience of an ad-hoc network to active attacks
is analyzed.
B. Trusted computing
Lots of research have been done in the area of trust and
trust attestation the past decade. So far, research focused
on PCs rather than other mobile devices, although standards
for mobile trust, e.g., the Mobile Trusted Module (MTM)
[8], proposed by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), have
emerged for defining trust measurements for various classes
of devices, including embedded devices. Trusted computing
technologies as defined by TCG [9] are slowly starting to
become adopted within the IT and telecommunication industry.
Trusted computing is built around the usage of a dedicated
hardware module, the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [10],
[11], supported by the majority of laptops on the market, and
which is also starting to be a standard component on almost
all x86 platforms. The TPM allows a user to securely create
and store secrets, identify itself towards external parties and to
report platform configuration status etc. The area of defining
viable trust metrics and trust evidence for a broad set of
embedded systems is still in its infancy and is currently subject
to lots of research. This includes principles for measurement
of trust levels as well as metrics to use for these measurements
[12], [13]. Many recent papers also target different models and
extensions to the TCG paradigm [14] [15].
C. Embedded systems security
Security for embedded systems cover everything from se-
cure communication to protection of the embedded system
execution environment. Secure communication is about the
correct choice (considering the embedded system capacity and
protection means) of algorithms and protocols for protecting
the device to device or device to infrastructure communication.
Most essential in this regard are efficient methods to distribute
and generate the needed cryptographic keys, i.e., key manage-
ment.
Secure execution in embedded systems is a difficult task
and covers issues ranging from the previously mentioned
trusted computing and a secure boot process to different
methods to create secure isolation between security critical
and non-security critical task on a single embedded device.
In particular, we are interested in investigating pure software
based isolation methods provided through a thin supervisor
running at the most privileged level in the system. Virtual
machine monitors or hypervisors have been found to be an apt
base for security services, thanks to the hypervisor’s isolation
and high-privilege visibility into and control over its guests
with research suggesting various novel applications such as
intrusion detection, malware monitoring, kernel protection, I/O
security, and system componentization [16], [17], [18]. Such
security services can offer protection to commodity guest OSs.
Hypervisor design for embedded systems, and in particular
on resource constrained devices, is a rather immature but
promising area. However, as was shown in [19], with the right
trade-offs and with careful hardware/software co-design, very
cost efficient embedded architectures with high security can
be achieved with hypervisors.
 
Fig. 1. Incident network scenario
III. AN INCIDENT NETWORK SCENARIO
A. Scenario overview
The need for trust evaluation arises in many different
communication scenarios. In particular in situations where two
previously unknown entities begin to communicate for the first
time. Typically such communication is triggered by a certain
need or network context. However, even if this is true, in order
to get a realistic view of the security requirements for such
events, one better starts an analysis from a concrete application
scenario. Hence, we have chosen to base our analysis on a
suitably demanding (from a trust perspective) scenario defined
in the Euler project [20]. The situation we consider is the com-
munication and collaboration between a collection of so-called
Incident Area Networks (IANs), which are being deployed on
the scene of a crisis as depicted in Figure 1. Each IAN is
administered and owned by a public safety organization, and
enables communication within this organization, in the area
of the event. IANs may also use different waveforms for their
internal communication. A typical IAN consists of
• A vehicle-based ”Network-In-a-Box” (NIB), i.e., a fully
autonomous and transportable network infrastructure,
with base station and all necessary network switching
and control functions. The NIB embedded radio unit is
a Software Defined Radio (SDR) device that allows new
radio wave forms to be configured ”on the fly”.
• A fleet of user terminals, called Public Safety Commu-
nications Devices (PSCDs)
Optionally, this elementary IAN is also connected to the
organizations permanent terrestrial infrastructure, which is
called a Jurisdiction Area Network (JAN). If all PSCDs in
this scenario belong to the same organization, normal mutual
authentication in combination with protected communication
between the PSCDs and the NIB would be sufficient security
measure. However, if PSCDs from different organizations also
are allowed to connect to the NIB, the situation is rather
different, as the hardware, platform and configurations of the
visiting PSCDs are unknown to the IAN or JAN manger of the
original incident network. This situation is depicted in Figure
2. Such a roaming scenario gives rise to a set of security
requirements that we discuss in more details below.
B. Security requirements
In the scenario we consider there are two major stakehold-
ers, the NIB manger and the roaming PSCD user. The security
Incident
Area
Visiting PSCD
Fig. 2. Roaming scenario
expectations from these two stakeholders form the foundation
for the requirements with respect to the trust evaluation that
we can derive from the scenario that we are studying. In order
to identify the most relevant requirements, we have used a
methodology where we first have identified the most important
security needs through analyzing a set of statements from the
stakeholders [20], [21]. These statements have then been re-
formulated into basic requirements. The result is summarized
in Table I. We have then complemented these requirements
with a set of security requirements derived through direct
analysis of the scenario in Figure 2 in Table II. Next we have
sorted the list of needs into different security categories and
presented those as a hierarchical diagram shown in Figure
3. Below, we discuss these requirements in more detail and
identify major research challenges with respect to the security
solutions that are needed to meet the requirements.
IV. RESEARCH CHALLENGES
The requirements identified in Figure 3 falls, as shown in the
diagram, into three different classes. One class covers access
control and authentication mechanisms on the involved nodes,
the second class is related to the software installation and man-
agement and the third class is about secure execution. In the
literature, and in most deployed systems, these three different
security classes are treated separately and the measures taken
to meet security requirements in these classes are done through
orthogonal technical solutions. There are for example well es-
tablished methods for authenticating devices in communication
networks as well as very rich frameworks for access control.
Trusted boot and software handling is the main contribution
from TCG as we discussed in Section II-B and there also exists
lots of proprietary solutions for secure software installation
and upgrade. Secure execution environments can be achieved
through physical or software based isolation and in particular
secure execution in embedded systems is a very active research
area as we discussed in Section II-C. The major technology
challenge when it comes to offering secure execution is the
ability to offer a high level of security at a reasonable cost.
The latter is important, as if large resources are available the
standard solution is separate physical execution environments
that have gone through rigorous security evaluations and that
provide strong isolation etc.
In a system context like the scenario we analyze in this
paper, the orthogonal approach to the three basic security
TABLE I
IDENTIFIED SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FROM STATEMENTS IN [20]
Statement No. Requirement
Fear of unauthorized use of ap-
plication and network services
1.1 Secure access control and
authentication mechanism on
PSCD and NIB units
Fear of unauthorized modifica-
tion of software
1.2 Secure software installation and
upgrade routines on PSCD and
NIB devices
Fear of NIB or PSCD compro-
mise through scripted attacks
1.3 Secure NIB and PSCD software
execution environments
Fear of SDR NIB compro-
mise through usage of un-
licensed/unsupported OS and
software
1.4 Strict control of NIB software
installation and usage
We need protection against at-
tacks that replace legal NIB
software payload at software
upgrade
1.5 Secure NIB software upgrade
routines
Fear of downloading invalid
NIB or PSCD software updates
1.6 Secure NIB and PSCD software
upgrade routines
Fear of bugs in NIB or PSCD
software
1.7 Strict verification of approved
NIB and PSCD software such as
formal verification/evaluation
Leakage of classified informa-
tion from the internal IAN/JAN
network to the visiting PSCD
1.8 The NIB node implementation
must ensure that only necessary
and authorized communications
flow from one domain to the
other
Develop a policy driven con-
figuration framework for SDR
that:
• downloads policies on
the fly
• verifies their certification
• parses, compiles and
loads the policies
• activates the desired ra-
dio device
• provides attestation of its
configuration to service
providers
1.9 NBR SDR policy framework
that:
• downloads policies on the
fly
• verifies their certification
• parses, compiles and loads
the policies
• activates the desired radio
device
• provides attestation of its
configuration to service
providers
Certify authenticity of configu-
ration software and validity of
the configuration to an external
entity:
• Prevent loading, instal-
lation, instantiation of
unauthorized software
• Verify that downloaded
software origins from a
trusted vendor
• Ensure confidentiality
and integrity of over-the-
air software download
and stored data
• Ensure the NIB operates
within allowed frequency
bands and power levels
specified by local regula-
tors
1.10 Strict control over NIB and
PSCD software installation, boot
and upgrade procedure:
• Prevent loading, installa-
tion, instantiation of unau-
thorized software
• Verify downloaded
software origins from a
trusted vendor
• Ensure confidentiality and
integrity of over-the-air
software download and
stored data
• Ensure the NIB operates
within allowed frequency
bands and power levels
specified by local regula-
tors
requirements classes mentioned above is not viable as there are
close dependencies between the different classes. For example,
a very strong authentication mechanism will not be secure
TABLE II
ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS IDENTIFIED FROM SCENARIO ANALYSIS
No. Requirement
2.1 When a PSCD roams to a visiting IAN, it must be possible for
the NIB in the visiting IAN to securely authenticate connecting
PSCD and for the PSCD to secure authenticate the NIB.
2.2 When a PSCD roams to a visiting IAN, it must be possible
for the NIB in the visiting IAN, to verify that the connecting
PSCD is in a trustworthy state prior to giving access to the
IAN and vice versa.
2.3 When a PSCD roams to a visiting IAN, it must be possible
for the NIB in the visiting IAN to securely verify the detailed
security policies that apply for the connecting PSCD and vice
versa. Access decision shall be based on the policies.
Security Needs
Secure access control and 
authentication mechanism 
on PSCD and NIB units (1.1)
Secure software installation 
and upgrade routines on 
PSCD and NIB devices (1.2) 
Secure NIB And PSCD 
software execution 
environments (1.3)
 The NIB node implementation must ensure 
that only necessary and authorized 
communications flow from one domain to 
the other (1.8)
Secure NIB and PSCD 
software upgrade 
routines  (1.4, 1.5, 1.6)
Strict verification of 
approved NIB and PSCD 
software such as formal 
verification/evaluation (1.7)
NIB SDR 
attestation of its 
configuration to 
service providers 
(1.9)
Prevent loading, 
installation, instantiation 
of unauthorized NIB or 
PSCD software (1.10)
Verify that downloaded 
software origins from a 
trusted vendor (1.10)
Ensure confidentiality 
and integrity of over-the-
air software download 
and stored data (1.10)
Ensure the NIB operates 
within allowed frequency 
bands and power levels 
specified by local 
regulators (1.10)
When a PSCD roams to a visiting IAN, it must 
be possible for the NIB in the visiting IAN to 
securely authenticate connecting PSCD (2.1)
When a PSCD roams to a visiting IAN, it must be 
possible for the NIB in the visiting IAN, to verify  
that the connecting PSCD is in a trustworthy state 
prior to giving  access to the  IAN (2.2)
When a PSCD roams to a visiting IAN, it must be 
possible for the NIB in the visiting IAN to securely 
verify the detailed security policies that apply for 
the connecting PSCD and to make access decision 
based on the policies in use (2.3)
Framework for secure 
download, update and 
establishment of NIB 
SDR security policies 
(1.9)
When a PSCD roams to a visiting 
IAN, it must be possible for the PSCD 
to secure authenticate the NIB (2.1)
When a PSCD roams to a visiting IAN, it must be 
possible for the PSCD  to securely verify the 
detailed security policies that apply for the 
connecting NIB it conects to and to make.  access 
decision based on the policies in use (2.3)
When a PSCD roams to a visiting IAN, it must 
be possible for the PSCD  to verify  that the NIB 
is in a trustworthy state prior to establish full 
connection with the visting IAN (2.2)
Fig. 3. Requirements represented as a hierarchy diagram
unless the software that actually implements the authentication
algorithm is trustworthy and runs in a secure execution envi-
ronment. In particular, in a scenario like our incident network
scenario where units from different administrative domains
and with different manufacturers need to communicate, there
is a basic need to combine traditional security properties
such as authentication and access control with well defined
methods to evaluate the level of trust that can be put into a
connecting unit or network and this level clearly depends on
the software/hardware that constitutes the connecting unit as
well as its execution environment. This leads to a set of new
research challenges that we discuss in more detail below.
A. Attribute-based Trust Evaluation
Assume that a mobile unit A comes in contact for the first
time with another unit B that it has never met before, and
that it wants to initiate a communication session with. At this
point A knows very little about B. Of course B also knows
very little about A, but this problem is symmetric so we will
not consider it explicitly.
In a case where there is a large number of units and a
multitude of unit owners and issuers the level of trust that A
has in B can vary a lot, depending on who B is, what attributes
it has and what credentials it can show. We are interested in
the problem of how trust can be created from attributes of the
communicating parties. This question can be divided into four
parts:
1) What attributes are relevant for trust building?
2) How can A be securely convinced of the values of B’s
attributes?
3) How are security attributes obtained or measured in
dynamic systems where units enters and leaves on a
regular basis?
4) How are access control security policies based on trust
attributes defined?
With respect to the first and third questions, the previously
discussed TCG framework (including extensions) constitute
a good starting point, but as the TCG framework mostly
deals with software integrity measurements, it needs to be
complemented with additional trust attributes and in particular
attributes that applies to dynamic systems. When looking into
the scenario we have analyzed, candidate attributes to consider
include (but are certainly not limited to):
• device/domain integrity at a certain point of time
• proof of the authenticity of a device, virtual machine or
a virtual set of machines
• verifiable software/OS version
• verifiable hardware identities
• device design certificate (e.g., based on Common Criteria
or approved self-tests)
• validity of manufacturing practices
• proof of device/domain ownership
• device/domain security policies
• communication and access policies
The first bullet above covers the TCG integrity attributes, i.e.,
hash of software binaries and signatures over these hashes.
However, in order to handle our dynamic scenario, it needs to
be complemented with properties such as proof of the identity
of the integrity attribute evaluator, the time of evaluation,
which require secure clock values including proof of time
value correctness as well as run time evaluation criteria. The
latter may include such things as cryptographic attestations of
policies and/or protocol transcripts. Other important attributes
to consider for trust evaluation include authenticity of device,
software, hardware or complete execution environments as
indicated in the second to fourth bullets. For example, the
promising recent research with respect to hypervisor based
protection of embedded systems that we discussed in Section
II-C, should be complemented with mechanisms that allows
a remote entity to actually verify the authenticity of the
hypervisor that is currently running. Not only the authenticity
is important. In some circumstances one cannot assume that it
is possible to make a trust decision based on the authenticity
of a software or hardware component, but we would need
more generic attributes that can give evidence on the security
quality of the whole device design such as a device design
certificate or proof that important manufacturing principles
have been followed. Obviously, important attributes include
the traditional security attributes such as proof of device or
domain ownership. Finally, in order to make trust decisions
an important security attribute to consider is that the security
policies that applies within a device as well as for information
exchange between the devices and external entities.
The first and second questions above are closely connected.
The potential attributes that we have listed cannot be verified
through a single verification mechanism. This implies that we
will need combinations of traditional authentication mecha-
nisms, certificates and novel attestation principles.
Probably, the most important and also most difficult prob-
lem, is the fourth question on how to combine different trust
attributes in order to make a trust decision. A trust decision
will define to what extent a device is trusted and hence will
determine which information and/or resources a device shall
be allowed to share with other devices. This needs to be
formulated as security policies that can be transferred to a unit
and constitute the basis for how the unit will act and protect its
resources in dynamic communication scenarios. Even if there
already exist well defined syntax languages for the description
of access control policies such as XACML [22], the major
issue lies in in how to combine different security attributes
into well defined policies that are easy to understand and
implement in real systems.
B. Analytic Evaluation and Comparison of Trust Models
In [6] is presented a simulation based effectiveness compar-
ison of four trust and reputation models. Such comparisons
are valuable in practice since when designing a system one
eventually has to decide on a model to use, and the better
the model the better the system. From a theoretical point of
view comparisons based on simulation are often suboptimal
in the sense that they usually have very little of explanatory
capacity. For this reason we would like to evaluate and
compare trust and reputation models using analytical tools
rather than simulation. We believe that by doing so it will
be possible to gain a deeper and more intuitive understanding
of how and why different models differ in performance. Our
ultimate motive is to be able to design new models with even
better performance using the insight gained in this analysis.
We realize that to be able to address the evaluation and
comparison analytically we will probably have to use simplifi-
cations and approximations to get expressions that are possible
to work with. In doing so there is of course a risk of loosing
accuracy to such a degree that the results will be incorrect.
For this reason we still want to verify any findings using
simulations. That is, the analytic approach is not a way of
reaching greater accuracy, it is a way of gaining insight that
we can use for improved constructions.
As a next step we would like to investigate how the
identified new trust models can be combined with the previous
discussed trust evaluation based on attributes. In particular
we would like to investigate how different models can be
”translated” into a trust attribute context and policies based
on trust attributes.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have investigated a dynamic incident
network scenario and in particular identified that to meet
the security needs in such scenario, new research is needed
with respect to how to evaluate the level of trust that can
be given to another entity when two or several units are
connected ad hoc. We need both new trust models and new
tools for trust evaluation. A common framework based on
trust attributes that allows efficient trust decision and security
policy expression on embedded devices lies at the top of
the “wish list”. In static environments and for computing
entities where one has the possibility to have tight control of
the hardware and the software, there is a very limited need
for advanced trust evaluation methods. On the other hand,
the current trends speak toward usage of standard hardware
components and open software environments in combination
with increased network connectivity and interconnection of
information systems. Hence it becomes critical to provide new
tools that can be used to configure advanced security policies
such that systems can still interact efficiently without getting
compromised as for the incident scenario we have presented.
We believe that trust evaluation is a key problem and we have
pointed out two research paths which we think are important
to secure future networked, embedded systems.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank Ahsant Mehran at Saab
in Ja¨rfa¨lla for good discussions and input with respect to the
incident network scenario analyzed in this paper.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, and J. O. Lacy, “Decentralized trust manage-
ment,” in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 1996, pp. 164–173.
[2] D. O’Callaghan, “Trust evaluation for the grid,” Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Dublin, Dublin, Apr. 2007.
[3] Y. L. Sun and Y. Yang, “Trust establishment in distributed networks:
Analysis and modeling,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International
Conference on Communications, 2007 (ICC ’07), Glasgow, Jun. 2007,
p. 1266–1273.
[4] S. Toivonen, G. Lenzini, and I. Uusitalo, “Context-aware trust evaluation
functions for dynamic reconfigurable systems,” in Proceedings of the
Models of Trust for the Web Workshop (MTWS06), held in conjunction
with the 15th International World Wide Web Conference (WWW2006),
Edinburgh, Scotland, May 2006.
[5] B. Liu, “Efficient trust negotiation based on trust evaluations and
adaptive policies,” Journal of Computers, vol. 6, no. 2, p. 240–245,
Feb. 2011.
[6] F. G. Ma´rmol and G. M. Pe´rez, “Trust and reputation models compari-
son,” Internet Research, vol. 21, no. 2, p. 138–153, 2011.
[7] Z. Yan, P. Zhang, and T. Virtanen, “Trust evaluation based security
solution in ad hoc networks,” Nokia Research Center, Helsinki, Finland,
Technical Report, 2003.
[8] TCG Mobile Phone Working Group, “TCG Mobile
Trusted Module Specification, Version 1.0,” 2008. [Online].
Available: http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/files/resource
files/87852F33-1D09-3519-AD0C0F141CC6B10D/Revision
6-tcg-mobile-trusted-module-1 0.pdf
[9] Trusted Computing Group, “TCG Architecture Overview, Version 1.4,”
2007. [Online]. Available: http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/files/
resource files/AC652DE1-1D09-3519-ADA026A0C05CFAC2/TCG
1 4 Architecture Overview.pdf
[10] ——, “TPM Specification, TPM Main Part I-III Design Principles,”
2007. [Online]. Available: http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/
resources
[11] S. L. Kinney, Trusted Platform Module Basics: Using TPM in Embedded
Systems (Embedded Technology). Newnes, 2006.
[12] M. Nauman, M. Alam, X. Zhang, and T. Ali, “Remote Attestation of At-
tribute Updates and Information Flows in a UCON System,” in Trusted
Computing, Second International Conference, Trust 2009, Oxford, UK,
April 6-8, 2009, Proceedings, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
vol. 5471. Springer, 2009, pp. 63–80.
[13] F. Baiardi, D. Cilea, D. Sgandurra, and F. Ceccarelli, “Measuring
Semantic Integrity for Remote Attestation,” in Trusted Computing,
Second International Conference, Trust 2009, Oxford, UK, April 6-8,
2009, Proceedings, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5471.
Springer, 2009, pp. 81–100.
[14] J. Li and A. Rajan, “An anonymous attestation scheme with optional
traceability,” in Trust and Trustworthy Computing, ser. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, A. Acquisti, S. Smith, and A.-R. Sadeghi, Eds., vol.
6101. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2010, pp. 196–210.
[15] S. Bratus, M. Locasto, and B. Schulte, “Segslice: Towards a new class
of secure programming primitives for trustworthy platforms,” in Trust
and Trustworthy Computing, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
A. Acquisti, S. Smith, and A.-R. Sadeghi, Eds., vol. 6101. Springer
Berlin / Heidelberg, 2010, pp. 228–245.
[16] A. Seshadri, M. Luk, N. Qu, and A. Perrig, “Secvisor: A tiny hypervisor
to provide lifetime kernel code integrity for commodity oses,” 2007.
[17] J. Yang and K. G. Shin, “Using hypervisor to provide data secrecy for
user applications on a per-page basis.” in VEE’08, 2008, pp. 71–80.
[18] H. A. Lagar-Cavilla, L. Litty, and D. Lie, “Hypervisor support for
identifying covertly executing binaries,” in 17th USENIX Security Sym-
possium, San Jose, CA, August 2008.
[19] C. Gehrmann, H. Douglas, and D. K. Nilsson, “Are there good reasons
for protecting mobile phones with hypervisors?” in The 8th Annual IEEE
Consumer Communications and Networking Conference (CCNC’2011),
Las Vegas, NV, USA, January 2008, pp. 493–498.
[20] The Europen FP7 project Euler, “Deliverable 3.2, General Design,
Version 1.0,” 2009. [Online]. Available: http://www.cwc.oulu.fi/euler/
EULER D3 2.pdf
[21] ——, “Deliverable 2.3, End-users requirements, Version 1.1,”
2010. [Online]. Available: http://www.cwc.oulu.fi/euler/D2 3End
users requirements.pdf
[22] S. Godik and T. Moses, “eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML),” Organization for the Advancement of Structured Informa-
tion Standards (OASIS), Standard, February 2003, http://www.oasis-
open.org/committees/xacml.
